

18 September 1999

# ODCSLOG IMA NEWSLETTER

## NOTE FROM THE 149<sup>th</sup> IMA COMMANDER

### SECTIONS UPDATE:

#### OPERATIONS

**Teaming of Active and National Guard Divisions.** Members of the 149<sup>th</sup> IMA helped to complete a project to review ODCSOPS proposed policy and associated briefing on Teaming concept. We concurred with the comment that the DCSLOG responsibilities ("The DCSLOG will adapt logistics procedures to support this policy.") need to be specified. The scope of generally adapting logistics procedures needs to be reduced and focused. The main effort of Teaming thus far has been directed to the 1st Cavalry/49th Armored Division (AD) teaming to provide mutual support of the Stabilization Force (SFOR) mission. This pilot program required significant resources to bring the 49th AD from a Tier 4 status to an active duty Category Level 3 status. This teaming and associated fielding of equipment to the 49th was facilitated by the co-location of both the 1st Cav and the 49th AD in the same state. This enabled the equipping and training of both the active and National Guard units to be conducted relatively smoothly. The rest of the pairings are not co-located or

in some cases they are located in different parts of

the country (i.e. Virginia/Maryland 29th Infantry Division (ID) paired with New York 10th Mountain Division). The logistical impact of these long distance teamings is unknown at this time. We know that funding will be required to bring these Tier 4 divisions up to active duty Category Level 3. We do not know what the impact of teaming will be in terms of logistics procedures.

**AR 350-9, Overseas Deployment Training-Completed** tasks to review AR 350-9 Overseas Deployment Training (ODT). It is a comprehensive regulation and provides the specific details necessary to fund and conduct ODT.

#### AUTOMATION SECTION

The Automation Section undertook initiatives to standardize unit personnel computer accounts.

### INSIDE

- **RESERVE COMPONENT EMPLOYMENT STUDY COMPLETED**
- **THE FUTURE OF THE ARMY MAINTENANCE POLICY**
- **TIMING OF RESERVE EDUCATION**

All personnel have been granted access to the Logistics Plans & Operations Division (POD) directories as a minimum. Personnel supporting additional divisions under the Directorate for Plans and Logistics Automation, as well as other Directorates within the DCSLOG were maintained. This standardization will allow the unit members the capability to share data in one consolidated mutually accessible location on the ODCSLOG network.

The 149<sup>th</sup> IMA Detachment Web Site is in the final stages of preparation and approval to be published on the World Wide Web as an activity under ODCSLOG. The web site will feature the unit's mission, organizational structure, recent briefings and accomplishments, Reserve Forces related information and links, upcoming events, vacancies, and much more.

## **RESERVE COMPONENT EMPLOYMENT 2005 STUDY COMPLETED**

The Department of Defense (DoD) announced today the completion of a one-year, department-wide collaborative effort, called the Reserve Component Employment 2005 Study (RCE-05), to formulate recommendations to the secretary of Defense for new and better ways to employ the military Reserve forces and foster Total Force integration.

Included are recommendations for explicit Service and joint efforts to: develop post-mobilization training requirements for Army National Guard divisions; create a 400-person joint Reserve "virtual organization" for information operations; determine optimum ways for the Reserve components to participate in managing the consequences of an attack using weapons of mass destruction; create more Air Force Associate Program units to address manning shortages; and evaluate the possible

transfer of two more squadrons of Active component bombers to the Air Force reserve components. The RCE-05 study also recommends a number of other follow-on studies. (Attached is a summary of the recommendations and follow-on studies.)

"The RCE-05 study is an important step in an ongoing and rigorous process of identifying new and better ways of using the Reserve components," said Charles L. Cragin, acting assistant secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. "Both the study itself and its follow-on recommendations will significantly enhance Secretary Cohen's efforts to build a fully integrated Total Force that is able to respond to a wide range of missions well into the next century."

In examining the role of the Reserve components in the future, the RCE-05 study focused on three areas: homeland defense, smaller-scale contingencies and major theater wars. In each area, the study reviewed several different initiatives, and for each one either recommended a near- or mid-term action, or determined that the particular initiative did not merit implementation in the foreseeable future.

The study included participants from the Active, Reserve and National Guard components of the Services and representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the unified commands

The RCE-05 study was launched in June 1998, as follow-on to Secretary Cohen's "seamless Total Force" memorandum of September 1997. The memorandum called upon the DoD civilian and military leadership to eliminate "all residual barriers -- structural and cultural" to effective integration of the Reserve and Active components. A Senior Steering Group co-chaired by Lt. Gen. Frank Campbell, J-8; Edward Warner, assistant secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction, and Cragin

provided senior oversight of the study. For more information, the full report is available at the DefenseLink address [http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/rces2005\\_072299.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/rces2005_072299.html) or contact the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, Lt. Col. Terry Jones at (703) 695-3620.

### Summary of the RCE-05 Study and its Principal Recommendations

In examining the role of the Reserve components in the future, the RCE-05 study focused on three areas: homeland defense, smaller-scale contingencies, and major theater wars. In each area, the study reviewed several different initiatives and for each one either recommended a near or mid-term action, or determined that the particular initiative did not merit implementation in the foreseeable future. Completion dates for follow-on actions range from late 1999 to summer 2000.

## Homeland Defense

Because homeland defense is becoming an increasingly important mission for the Department of Defense, the study examined several initiatives to increase RC participation in homeland defense missions in considerable detail. In many cases the Reserve Components are particularly well-suited to homeland defense missions because there is RC infrastructure throughout all fifty states and territories, and RC units are already familiar with disaster response requirements, a significant component of the homeland defense mission.

Employing RC Units for WMD Consequence Management Missions. Several studies are underway within the Department of Defense to better define the requirements for consequence management and critical infrastructure protection, and the RCE-05 study drew on this ongoing work to examine whether "dual-

missioning" certain RC units might be productive.

To determine more precisely how certain RC units could focus on homeland defense missions, the study recommends tasking the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I, ACOM, the Services and their components to determine the mission requirements for homeland defense. The follow-on study also would examine which RC units could be "dual-missioned" to meet these requirements while retaining their traditional wartime focus, and which units would need to be re-missioned or restructured to focus solely on homeland defense tasks.

Create A Joint RC Virtual Information Operations Organization. To further explore how the Reserve Components could contribute to the homeland defense mission, and to capitalize on existing skills within the Reserve Components, the study examined the costs and benefits of developing a 400-person joint integrated Reserve Component "virtual organization" for information operations and information assurance.

The study recommends tasking the J-6 Directorate in the Joint Staff, in coordination with the Defense Information Systems Agency and the Services, to implement this initiative, which the J-6 has already begun developing, to evaluate its effectiveness and examine in more detail how to address the management challenges such a unit would pose.

Increase RC Participation in a JTF Headquarters for Homeland Defense. To better determine how the Reserve Components might contribute to the command and control of homeland defense missions, the study examined how RC personnel might participate in a Joint Task Force headquarters for Homeland Defense.

The study provided its assessment to USACOM for consideration as it continues to develop homeland defense-related command and control architecture, and recommended that USACOM consider how to best incorporate the Reserve Components into these systems.

Use RC Personnel for National Missile Defense Missions. If the United States deploys a national missile defense system in the next few years, the Reserve Components may be able to participate significantly in this mission.

Recognizing that there is not yet a final decision on what type of national missile defense system the United States might deploy, the study recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, in coordination with the Ballistic Missile Defense Office (BMDO) and its National Missile Defense program office, consider how the Reserve Components could be used most effectively to man a future system.

## **Smaller-Scale Contingencies**

As the demand for U.S. participation in smaller-scale contingency operations remains high, the Department of Defense is looking for new ways to conduct these operations as efficiently as possible and manage operational tempo effectively. Increasing the role of the Reserve Components in these operations may make more effective use of the range of skills inherent in those forces, and provide an important mechanism to help manage operational tempo for the Active Component (AC).

RC rotations for Inter-Positional Peacekeeping Operations. Requiring that the Reserve Components participate in rotations of interpositional peacekeeping operations like the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) mission in the Sinai could increase RC participation in smaller-scale contingencies

while relieving some operational tempo for the Active Component.

The study recommends that the Army and its components, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, OSD/RA, and the Joint Staff, conduct a detailed study to determine whether such an initiative is feasible, and if so, the optimum frequency for Reserve Component rotations.

RC Assume a Bosnia-like Peacekeeping Operation. The study examined whether the Reserve Components could provide forces sufficient for one continuous rotational follow-on peacekeeping operation similar to the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia. Based on the scope and extended duration of such operations, the study determined that meeting such a requirement exclusively with the Reserve components would stress units in several high-demand areas, be costly, and would not be possible using only volunteers, requiring a Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC).

Based on the high financial costs of this initiative and its probable impact on RC operational tempo, the study recommends that no further action be taken on this initiative.

Review CINC Rotational Timeline Restrictions. Currently both US European Command and US Central Command set minimum rotation lengths for personnel serving in contingency operations in those theaters. US Central Command requires that individual RC personnel serve at least 120 days. US Central Command allows RC units to serve a minimum of 90 days, but prefers that units serve for 120 to 179-day rotations. US European Command requires individual RC personnel to serve in 90-day rotations, while RC units serve a minimum of 29 days. The study examined whether shortening the required number of rotation days would facilitate

increased RC participation in smaller-scale contingency operations such as the Stabilization Force in Bosnia.

To better assess the impact of shortening rotational requirements, the study recommends tasking the Joint Staff J3 and J5, in coordination with OSD/RA, the CINCs and the Services, to complete a review of rotational policies. The review will examine in detail the impact of shortening rotational requirements, including costs and operational risks that might be incurred, and recommend exceptions to rotational policies where merited.

**Meet Initial SSC Requirements with AC Only.** When the U.S. military deploys today for a smaller-scale contingency, units found largely in the Reserve Components must meet several of the initial mission requirements. Because the Reserve Components are not designed to respond as rapidly overall as the Active Component, calling up these specialized units on extremely short notice is complicated and stressful for RC personnel.

Given the significant financial costs, the policy shift involved, and the lack of endorsement for this initiative among active or reserve component leadership, the study recommends no further action be taken along these lines.

**Expand RC Use in Meeting LD/HD requirements.** Because certain high demand, low density (HD/LD) units and personnel in the Active Component are experiencing high operational tempo due to the volume of ongoing operations, the study examined whether expanding RC participation in these areas would help relieve some of the tempo concerns.

To facilitate drawing on the Reserve Components to relieve personnel tempo for HD/LD AC individuals, the study tasked the Services, in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, to

develop a mechanism to track individual HD/LD skills and identify actions for relieving high tempo demands.

## **Major Theater Wars**

The Reserve Components have played an important role in supporting the Active Component when the United States goes to war. Today our National Military Strategy requires that the Total Force be able to fight and win two major theater wars in overlapping time frames, in addition to performing other important shaping and responding missions. To ensure that the Total Force is able to meet these requirements, the study examined a range of possible initiatives to increase the role of the Reserve Components in major theater war.

**Examine ESBs Post-Mobilization Training and Integrated Division Employment.** The study examined post-mobilization training for enhanced separate brigades (eSBs) and how eSBs are being incorporated into the Army's integrated division concept.

The study endorsed the Army's efforts to ensure it provides sufficient resources through its budget to ensure that an eSB can be prepared to deploy within 90 days, and that eSBs can be made available as required by existing operational plans. The study also recommended that the Army examine whether to provide additional training sites, to include consideration of a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the U.S. Marine Corps to facilitate use of Twentynine Palms, CA. If there are other existing sites that may be available for training soon after mobilization, the Army should consider developing MOAs with the relevant Services to secure their use.

Finally, the study examined how the eSBs are being incorporated into the Army's AC/RC Integrated Division concept. The Integrated Division concept establishes an active duty

division headquarters to oversee the training and readiness of its associated three enhanced separate brigades. While this arrangement provides readiness and training benefits to the eSBs, under this concept the integrated division is not deployable because it lacks a division combat support/combat service support base. Although the AC/RC Integrated Divisions currently are not deployable as a division-sized combat formation, the Army has identified deployability as a possible future evolution of this concept. The study endorses the Army's plan for the continued evolution of this concept as more experience is gained with the organization.

Create Round-Up Relationships for eSBs. Establishing "Round-Up" relationships between certain enhanced Separate Brigades (eSBs) and certain active Army combat divisions could prove beneficial in terms of increasing the role of the RC in major theater wars and in increasing the combat power of certain Army divisions. As established in Army doctrine during the 1980s, the concept of "rounding-up" a combat division envisions designating an Army National Guard brigade as the fourth ground maneuver brigade in a division during wartime. This linkage is distinct from the concept of a "round out" relationship, which entails designating an Army National Guard brigade as the integral third ground maneuver brigade of an active combat division.

The RCE-05 Study recommends that the Army, in coordination with OSD Reserve Affairs, Strategy and Threat Reduction, Program, Analysis and Evaluation, the Joint Staff and the CINCs, conduct a review to determine the number of optimum cases for eSB round-up relationships.

Examine Post-Mobilization Training for the ARNG Divisions. While the eSBs are being sufficiently resourced to meet their requirements in current war plans, there are no current formal

post-mobilization training requirements for the ARNG divisions. In order for the ARNG divisions to be included fully in existing war plans, the Army will need to establish post-mobilization training standards and timelines for deployment of the divisions.

The study recommends tasking the Army (all components), in coordination with the Assistant Secretaries of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction and Reserve Affairs, CJCS and ACOM, to formulate standards and guidelines for the validation of Army National Guard divisions, based on common deployment standards for Active and Guard divisions, and to establish post-mobilization preparation and deployment plans for the ARNG divisions. The study would also identify associated training and resource requirements, including analysis of options for the provision of additional post-mobilization training sites, facilities, and capabilities; potential enhancements to existing levels of peacetime readiness in ARNG divisions; and integration of ARNG divisions with enhanced Separate Brigades into the post-mobilization training sequence

Define the Strategic Reserve. Throughout the Cold War, a major role for the Reserve Components was serving as a Strategic Reserve in the event of global war. Given the threat posed by the Soviet Union, it was prudent to have a significant reservoir of personnel who could augment active and reserve forces if a U.S.-Soviet conflict proved more challenging than the war plans predicted. In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, U.S. defense strategy called for the reconstitution of military capabilities in the event the security environment proved to be substantially more challenging than predicted. This reconstitution would have drawn heavily from a Strategic Reserve of military capabilities. A survey of post-Cold War Defense Department strategy and planning documents reveals that today there is no official Department-wide definition

outlining the potential need or employment concept for a Strategic Reserve.

As a result, the Department of Defense needs to determine the mission and requirements for a Strategic Reserve in the overall U.S. defense strategy. Only then can the Department determine the capabilities needed to meet that mission. Accordingly, the study recommends that the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs and the Joint Staff conduct a two-part study to define the concept of a Strategic Reserve, and subsequently to determine the military requirements and possible force options associated with the Strategic Reserve mission.

## **MG SULLIVAN, JR EXPLAINS THE FUTURE OF THE ARMY MAINTENANCE POLICY:**

In a letter to the Editor of the Army Logistician magazine, MG Sullivan, JR describes the future of Army maintenance. This letter can be viewed online at <http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/SepOct99/MS483.htm>

I am writing in reference to the article on page 18 in the May-June issue of ALOG, "Combat Service Support—Rising to the Challenge of Shrinking Resources." The article detailed how the Equipment Support Center, Mannheim (ESCM), 51<sup>st</sup> Maintenance Battalion, in USAREUR has adapted to shrinking resources and an evolving mission while still delivering quality service by adopting the inspect and repair only as necessary (IRON) concept. While the article was well written and certainly highlighted significant accomplishments, I feel that I must take this opportunity to comment on the future direction of Army maintenance policy.

Under the Single Stock Fund and National Maintenance Programs, the focus for national level maintenance is to support the process of repair and return to stock. This national maintenance mission, coupled with a realization that the Army is experiencing declining mean time between maintenance actions for items ordered from stock, due to items being repaired and returned to stock to differing maintenance standards, has led the Army to establish a single quality standard for items repaired and returned to stock. The single quality standard for all items repaired and returned to stock will be overhaul, regardless of the maintenance activity performing the maintenance action. Overhaul is defined as maintenance that restores equipment or components to the equivalent useful life of a newly acquired item. This process involves inspection and diagnosis according to the depot maintenance work requirement (DMWR) or similar technical documentation that identifies all components exhibiting wear or age and directs the replacement or adjustment of those items to original equipment specifications.

With the establishment of one quality repair standard—overhaul—reliability will increase, thereby reducing the number of maintenance actions required. Individual repair costs may go up, but overall operating and support costs will be reduced because the number of repair actions will be drastically reduced.

Under this policy change, IRON will no longer be an acceptable concept of maintenance for items repaired and returned to stock. The intent of this change in policy is to ensure that when a field unit pays full AMDF price for an item, regardless of the source of repair, they will receive a part that is repaired to the same quality standard and has a "like new" expected service life.

This policy change is incorporated into the latest version of AR 750-1, which is due for publication and distribution in the first quarter of FY 00.

# **MOVEMENT TRACKING SYSTEM PROTOTYPES SUCCEED IN REAL-WORLD MISSIONS**

[http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/SepOct99/SYS  
TEMS.htm](http://www.almc.army.mil/alog/SepOct99/SYS<br/>TEMS.htm)

A truck driver doesn't have to ask "where am I?" In his cab, he plots his location on his laptop, which also allows him to communicate with movement control using the Movement Tracking System (MTS).

MTS is an adaptation of a commercial technology that will make its transition into military operations with only minor technical modification. Coupled with emerging transportation and supply management systems, MTS will give managers near-real-time, in-transit visibility of vehicles and their cargoes.

Beginning in the third quarter of 2000, this capability will be a regular part of how the Army manages transportation and its loads. System prototypes have proven themselves already in exercises in Korea, at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California, and in III Corps at Fort Hood, Texas. In Europe, various versions of the MTS are on over 1,000 vehicles, providing information as they move from points of debarkation in Germany to their final destinations in Bosnia in support of Operation Joint Forge.

The need for MTS is based on evolution of warfighting doctrine that calls for increased maneuverability and enlargement of the battle area. These changes require situational awareness not only for combat leaders but also for those in support. The fielding of this new family of information technology devices will give users the ability to pinpoint the location of common-user logistics transports and transport

watercraft, track their progress, and electronically communicate with them.

The expansion of the Force XXI corps battlespace (240 percent larger than the Army of Excellence) represents a dramatic increase in operating area and presents numerous challenges that outstrip the ability of current tactical communications. Overlaying the corps battlespace on American geography illustrates the challenge. Corps-level transporters will be responsible for delivering supplies and equipment in an area that would stretch from Baltimore, Maryland, to Roanoke, Virginia. Given this distance and the average speed of tactical vehicles on secondary roads, transit time could be as long as 23 hours. If we view Operation Desert Storm as an indicator of the velocity of war, we can see that a lot can happen in 23 hours. Trucks and their loads must be able to react on the move to support the developing battle. In addition to the expansion of the operating area, transporters also must contend with the reality of the asymmetrical, nonlinear battlefield, in which combat is encountered over the entire battlespace and not confined to the forward edge. To support operations in such an environment, a system is needed to provide continuous command and control for the transportation assets that provide support to warfighters and to coordinate force protection.

As its mission statement reads, MTS will support missions through the full spectrum of military operations from peacetime to war. It will provide commanders and managers with near-real-time data on the location and status of movements. The system will improve effectiveness and efficiency of limited distribution nodes, provide the ability to reroute supplies to higher priority needs, and inform operators of hazards and changes to unit locations.

MTS relies on satellite communications rather than cellular or tactical radios because of its



large geographic operating area. Satellites serve two purposes. They provide location data using a global positioning system (GPS). Control stations and mobile units use a GPS and digitized maps to show users the precise location of assets, hazards, and directions. Satellites also permit MTS operators at control stations and mobile units to exchange messages.

MTS consists of laptop computers, subscriber controller hardware and antennas for communications, and a GPS. Satellite communications provided by commercial vendors must provide specific area coverage and data quality and meet response specifications.

Although MTS currently is a stand-alone system, interfaces are planned for the Transportation Coordinators Automated Information for Movements System II (TC AIMS II) and the Global Combat Support System-Army (GCSS-Army). MTS, coupled with radio frequency tags, will allow GCSS-Army and TC AIMS II to provide the virtual status of shipments, including manifests and document numbers. On the battlefield, this MTS/GCSS-Army/TC AIMS II information system will permit pinpoint distribution and redirection of materiel. At the strategic level, managers operating the Global Transportation Network, the Joint Total Asset Visibility system, and the Logistics Intelligence Data Base using data from GCSS-Army and TC AIMS II would be able to manage and direct resources down to the shipment level.

MTS prototypes operating in various environments and operations have demonstrated that a mature commercial technology can be adapted to military application. The challenge now is to train operators and managers and to employ the system on a global basis.

For more information, contact Jon Quinn, CASCOM MTS project officer, at (804) 734-

2672 (DSN 687-2672), or send e-mail to [quinnj@lee.army.mil](mailto:quinnj@lee.army.mil).

## **TIMING OF RESERVE EDUCATION**

This is from the MilitaryReport, The Military Community's Only FREE Weekly Email Newsletter

<http://www.militaryreport.com>

Army reserve officers may have to complete their professional military educational requirements sooner than they expected. As of October 1996, reserve and National Guard officers have to be considered for promotion and, if selected, promoted prior to reaching their maximum years-of-service for their current grade. Beginning 2001, reserve component officer promotion board zones of consideration have been expanded in order to ensure compliance with the law. As a result some officers will likely be considered for promotion earlier, perhaps as much as a year earlier, than otherwise anticipated. Therefore, all officers who will be considered for promotion starting in 2001 should complete the professional military education required for promotion as soon as possible. Reserve and Guard commands are expected to announce the zones of consideration and the year groups that will be affected shortly.

## **USAR LIST SERVER**

All interested parties can be apart of this information service. It provides a medium that Reservists can use to gather information and ask questions about the "How Tos" and the "Whats" of the Reserves

If you want to add your address to the list server, e-mail your address to the following address:

[Usarfyo@pentagon-hqdadss.army.mil](mailto:Usarfyo@pentagon-hqdadss.army.mil)

The Subject of the mail should be your Rank

and Last Name. The Body of the message should state that you would like to be included on the USAR FYI list server

## LOGISTICS OPERATION CENTER SOP

Anyone reporting for duty in the Logistics Operations Center (LOC) should find a copy of the standard operating procedure (SOP) manual at their desk. The SOP was written by the 149<sup>th</sup> IMA Detachment to document LOC operations. It covers the standard requirements as well as such things as where to find supplies and how to get computer equipment to work. This SOP is especially useful during the night shift when more experienced LOC personnel are often not available for guidance.

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### CHANGE OF ADDRESS:

To speed delivery of this newsletter, it will be published electronically. This will be accomplished initially by e-mail and eventually by posting on the ODCSLOG Internet web site. If you would like to receive the newsletter by e-

mail, write to the commander at [teum@hqda.army.mil](mailto:teum@hqda.army.mil).

If your address has changed, please indicate your new address below and mail it to:

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